## 1

Text: The United States federal government should remove the travel ban to gradually remove the embargo

#### Removing the embargo gradually solves – immediate removal causes instability

Zimmerman 10 – CHELSEA A. ZIMMERMAN, Georgetown Law, ’10, “Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy,” <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf>, ACC. 6-13-2013)

Elimination of the trade embargo immediately is not a feasible solution, as such a proposal would not attract sufficient political support. Furthermore, the Cuban political and legal infrastructure does not have the capability of adapting to such a radical change. Instead, I recommend incremental measures that would 1) reduce the restrictions on the financing of Cuba’s purchase of U.S. products by allowing payments to be made directly to U.S. banks; and 2) reduce and eventually eliminate the restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba by initially permitting travel for educational and cultural purposes and eventually permitting direct commercial flights from the U.S. to Cuba. The U.S. International Trade Commission’s analysis of the effects of government restrictions on export financing estimates that the U.S. share of Cuban agricultural, fish and forest product imports would increase between one-half and two-thirds, and that all U.S. agricultural sectors would benefit from the lifting of financing restrictions (U.S. International Trade Commission). The Commission also studied the effect on U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba if travel restrictions were eliminated, and concluded that significant increases in U.S. exports of processed foods, poultry, beef and pork and fish would result (U.S. International Trade Commission).

## 2

#### The plan re-inscribes neoliberalism – the alternative is to reject neoliberalism

Harris 8 (Richard L Harris: Professor of Global Studies at California State University, Monterey Bay; Managing Editor of the Journal of Developing Societies (SAGE India); and Coordi­ nating Editor of Latin American Perspectives (SAGE USA). “Latin America’s Response to Neoliberalism and Globalization,” http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3506\_2.pdf)

The economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries is obstructed by the power relations and international structures that regulate the world capitalist system. The structures of this system provide a hierarchical political and economic exoskeleton that constrains all national efforts to pursue any significant degree of self-directed, inward-oriented, balanced and environmentally sustainable development. Indeed, the geopolitical power structures that preserve and support the world capitalist system have made it almost impossible for the governments of the core as well as the peripheral countries in this system to pursue a path of inward-oriented, equitable, democratically controlled and environmentally sustainable development (Amin 2001b:20). Since the 1980s, inter-American relations and the economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean states have been shaped by these geo­ political structures and the neoliberal strategic agenda put forward by the government of the United States of America (USA), the major transnational corporations and the three major international financial institutions (IFIs) that operate in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Harris and Nef, 2008). This later group of IFIs includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The policies of these IFIs based in Washington generally follow the dictates of the government of the USA due to the controlling influence that it exercises over these institutions. Their agenda for the Latin American and Caribbean region gives priority to promoting and protecting the interests of the major investors and transnational corporations that are largely based in the USA and operate in the region. It also serves to maintain and strengthen the geopolitical hegemony of the USA over the Western Hemisphere (Harris and Nef). But conditions are changing. Washington’s neoliberal agenda for controlling the capi­ talist development of the Western Hemisphere and maintaining US hegemony over the region is increasingly threatened by a progressive alternative agenda for the regio­ nal integration of the Latin American and Caribbean countries that has begun to gain widespread support in the region. This alternative agenda for the region calls for the autonomous economic development of the region free of the hegemonic control and influence of the USA and the IFIs based in Washington. Not only does this type of development pose a fundamental threat to the hegemony of the USA in the region, it threatens the dominance of transnational capital throughout the Americas. Moreover, it also poses a significant threat to the global expansion and integration of the world capitalist system in general and to the global hegemonic coalition led by the government and transnational corporations of the USA. Today, political and economic strategies are being developed for moving from the prevailing export-oriented neoliberal model of economic development to new in­ ward-oriented models of sustainable development, tailored to the diverse conditions, economic capacities, political structures, natural endowments and cultural values of the societies involved. Moreover, a growing number of international and regional civil society organizations have emerged in recent years to create such alternatives. What the forums, networks, programs, and activities of these various types of organizations reveal is that there is a growing international network of organizations and social movements committed to promoting new, more equitable forms of international cooperation and regulation that support inward-oriented and sustainable development as well as genuine democracy at the regional and national levels. At the same time, these organizations argue that the present global trading regime that has been erected under the WTO should and can be replaced by a new global trading system that replaces the present system of so-called free but in fact unfair trade, with a sys­ tem that ensures «fair trade» and promotes South-South economic exchange and coo­ peration. Most of the progressive alternatives advocated by these organizations and the new left-leaning governments that have been elected to office in the region give priority to aligning the external relations of the countries in the region to the internal needs of the majority of the population. That is to say, decisions about what to export and what to import should be aligned with the needs of the population rather than the interests of transnational capitalists and transnational corporations or the hegemonic interests of the USA. Some of these alternative strategies involve what Walden Bello (2002) has referred to as «deglobalization.» That is to say, they involve unlinking the economies of these peripheral capitalist societies from the advanced capitalist centers of the world economy, particularly in the USA. They also involve throwing off the constraints that have been imposed upon the economic policies and structures of the­ se countries by the IFIs (IMF, World Bank, and IDB), the WTO and the other agents and regulatory regimes that regulate the world capitalist system. In fact, there appears to be growing interest throughout Latin America in revivifying the Pan-American ideal of unification, currently perhaps best expressed in Hugo Chávez’ Bolivarian dream of turning South America into a regional economic hegemon (DeLong, 2005). The governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay have indicated they want to join the government of Venezuela in creating a regional union. It has been proposed that this coalescing continental confederation should shift the region’s extra-continental trade towards Europe, Asia and South Africa and away from North America. The prospect of this happening appears to have alarmed Washington more than the increasing number of electoral triumphs of leftist politicians in the region (Delong). There has also been considerable talk in the region about creating a single currency for the South American countries that would be modeled on and perhaps tied to the Euro rather than the US Dollar. This discussion is symptomatic of what appears to be an emerging desire to create an integrated economic and political community that is strikingly different from the type of hemispheric economic integration scheme being pursued by the Washington and its allies in the region (DeLong). Moreover, there is an increasing tendency in the region to find alternatives to trading with the USA. In particular, several Latin American nations (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile) have been strengthening their economic relations with Asia, particularly with China. But the widespread popular opposition to neoliberalism and so-called globalization, and the shift to the Left in the region’s politics, represent much more than a serious challenge to US hegemony, they also represent a serious threat to the existing pattern of capitalist development in the region. Central to Washington’s strategy for the hemisphere has been the imposition of a neoliberal model of capitalist development on the region which involves the increasing integration of the region’s economies into a hemispheric ‘free trade’ area or rather a trade bloc that is dominated by the USA. This project is itself an essential part of the strategy of the USA for the domination of the global economy by its transnational corporations. The restructuring of the economies of the region under the mantra of neoliberalism and the banner of globalization has been aimed at giving the USA-based transnational corporations and investors free reign within the region and a strong hemispheric base from which to dominate the world economy In opposition to the neoliberal, polyarchical and globalizing model of development that has been imposed by the government of the USA and its allies in the region, the growing movement for an alternative form of development that is both genuinely democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable appears to be gaining ground in various parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. This alternative model of development requires the reorganization and realignment of the existing economies in the region. It also requires the replacement of the existing political regimes, which serve the interests of the transnational bloc of social forces that are behind the integration of the region into the new global circuits of accumulation and production that the major trans­ national corporations and the IFIs have been constructing since the 1970s. In addition to fundamental economic changes, most of the existing pseudo-democratic political regimes in the region need to be thoroughly democratized so that they are responsive to and capable of serving the needs and interests of the majority of the people rather than the ruling polyarchies and the transnational corporations operating in the region. An essential requirement for realigning the region’s economies so that they produce people-centered and environmentally sustainable development is the integration of these economies into a regional economic and political union that has the resources, structures and the power to operate independently of the government of the USA and the transnational corporations based in the USA as well as in the European Union and Japan. If this type of regional integration takes place, it will enable the Latin American and Caribbean states to break free of the hegemonic influence of the USA, and reverse the denationalization (‘globalization’) of the Latin American and Caribbean economies. Instead of the corporate-driven hemispheric integration of the region under the hegemony of the USA, a new system of regional economic cooperation and both equitable as well as environmentally sustainable development is desperately needed to improve the lives of the vast majority of the people living in Latin America and the Caribbean. This type of regional, equitable and sustainable development can only be success­ fully carried out by truly democratically elected political leaders with broad-based popular support who are sincerely committed to achieving this alternative rather than the elitist neoliberal model. It probably will also require democratic socialist political institutions and structures of production and distribution. Regionalism has been the dream of the democratic left for some time. The European Union has its origins in the French socialist dream of ending Franco-German enmity through unifying Europe, and African regionalism was the vision of African socialists such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who saw regional integration as the only means to progress beyond tribalism and colonialism and create a united and democratic Africa (Faux, 2001:4). Viewed from the perspective of those who want to create a people-cen­ tered, democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable social order in the Ame­ ricas, the corporate-dominated process of capitalist pseudo-globalization taking place in the region and around the world urgently needs to be replaced by what Samir Amin has referred to as a new system of «pluricentric regulated globalization» (Amin, 2001a). This alternative form of globalization requires the development of regional economic and political unions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and elsewhere, which collaboratively promote people-centered, democratic and envi­ ronmentally sustainable forms of development on a regional basis. According to Amin, these regional unions of states are needed to collaborate as partners in collecti­ vely regulating the global restructuring of the world economy for the benefit of the vast majority of humanity rather than the transnational corporations and the northern centers of the world capitalist system in the USA, Europe and Japan. This type of regional-based regulative order is needed to regulate and redirect inter­ national economic, social, and political relations so that these relations serve the inte­ rests and needs of the vast majority of the world’s population. The present power structures and regulatory regime of the world capitalist system support the transna­ tional corporate-driven restructuring and denationalization of the economies of both the societies at the core and in the periphery of this system. The Latin American and Caribbean countries need to ‘de-link’ step-by-step from this exploitative and inequitable system. They need to redirect and restructure their eco­ nomies so that they serve the needs of the majority of their people while also protec­ ting their natural resources and ecosystems. The alternative policies of economic, poli­ tical and social development proposed and in some cases adopted by the new leftist leaders, the progressive civil society organizations and their supporters, combined with the project of regional integration associated with the new Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), are significant indications of unprecedented and pro­ found transformation unfolding in the Americas. A growing number of civil society organizations and social movements throughout the Americas are pressuring the governments of the region to follow what the pro­ gressive civil society networks such as the Alianza Social Continental/ Hemispheric Social Alliance (ASC/HSA) describes as a regional model of integration that supports the environmentally sustainable and democratic development of all the societies in the region (see ASC-HSA, 2006). The ASC/HSA also contends that the UNASUR pro­ ject and the Bolivarian dream of unification is threatened by the so-called free trade agreements that Washington has negotiated with Chile, Colombia, Peru, the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. As the ASC/HSA makes clear in its documents and public information campaigns, these agreements compromise the national sovereignty, obstruct the local production of medicines, threaten public health, facilitate the profit-driven privatization of water and vital services such as health and sanitation, and threaten the survival of indigenous cultures, biodiversity, food sovereignty, and local control over natural resources. The «Alternatives for the Americas» proposal developed by this inter-American network of progressive civil society organizations and social movements calls on all governments in the region to subordinate trade and investments to sustainability and environmental protection as well as social justice and local democratic control over economic and social development (ASC/HSA 2002:5). The growing number and political influence of these kinds of networks, organizations and movements provide unquestionable evidence of the emergence of the social for­ ces and political conditions that Panitch (1996:89) and others (Harris, 1995:301-302; Jo­ nas and McCaughan, 1994) predicted in the 1990s would arise in opposition to neoli­ beralism, corporate-dominated pseudo globalization and the extension and consolida­ tion of the hegemony of the USA. It now seems increasingly possible that these forces and the political mobilization that they have helped to create will transform the politi­ cal regimes in the region as well as the nature of inter-American relations, bring about the regional integration of the Latin American countries and free these countries from US hegemony and the form of ‘turbo-capitalism’ to which they have been subjected. At this point, we can only speak in general terms about the new model(s) of develop­ ment that will replace the neoliberal model of uneven and inequitable development that has pillaged most of the region.

#### Extinction---tech and reforms fail

Richard A. Smith 7, Research Associate at the Institute for Policy Research & Development, UK; PhD in History from UCLA, June 2007, “The Eco-suicidal Economics of Adam Smith,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 22-43

In the midst of the record-breaking heat wave in the summer of 2003, George Monbiot, the renowned columnist for the London Guardian, penned a short but eloquent essay entitled "Sleepwalking to Extinction." Monbiot wrote: We live in a dreamworld. With a small, rational part of our brain, we recognize that our existence is . . . destroying the conditions for human life on earth. Were we governed by reason, we would be on the barricades today, dragging the drivers of Range Rovers and Nissan Patrols out of their seats, occupying and shutting down the coal-burning power stations, bursting in upon the Blairs' retreat from reality in Barbados and demanding a reversal of economic life as dramatic as the one we bore when we went to war with Hitler.1 But despite the frightening trends and increasingly desperate pleas from the world's scientists, the world's corporate and political leadership show no sign of abandoning denial and adopting "reason" nor scrapping business-as-usual to mobilize against catastrophe. The ritual has now become depressingly familiar and predictable: After each new "shocking" report on melting icecaps, the slowing Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic, or eco-devastation in Africa or China, "concerned" politicians call for "immediate action" and "drastic steps" to curb emissions but then do nothing of substance. Successive post-Kyoto talks begin with urgent pleas from devastated Third World peasants and expert scientists, then collapse in disagreement. At every turn, the priority of growth and profits overrides every ringing alarm, and society carries on in its "sleepwalk to extinction." In the latest rehearsal of this charade, the United Nations talks on climate change in Nairobi in November 2006 collapsed with no firm targets adopted and every issue of any seriousness postponed yet again. Then-UN secretary-General, Kofi Annan, decried the assembled ministers as "frighteningly timid," "lacking in leadership" and said they displayed "a failure of political will." One Greenpeace observer remarked that "the glaciers in Greenland are moving faster than the negotiators."2 The Nairobi session came just after Britain's Treasury secretary and former World Bank chief economist, Sir Nicholas Stern, sounded the latest alarm with his own blistering report laying down a challenge to Britain, the U.S., and developing nations like China and India that the planet faces imminent catastrophe unless urgent measures are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions immediately. Stern's warning went beyond restating an apocalyptic vision of hundreds of millions fleeing floods and drought; it struck at the heart of the corporate resistance to environmental measures by demonstrating that the cost of inaction could result in the permanent loss of perhaps 20 percent of global output, while the cost of preventive action right now is as little as 1 to 2 percent of global gross national product (GNP). By illustrating the huge economic cost that inaction will impose on the industrialized economies, Stern's report should have knocked the last leg out from under the "environment versus economy" argument. Reiterating the conclusions of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scientists, Stern warned that just to stabilize CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at between 450 and 500 parts per million, we will have to cut global emissions by 25 percent and wealthy country emissions by 60 percent by 2050. Presenting the findings in London, Prime Minister Tony Blair said the consequences of inaction were "literally disastrous" and warned: This disaster is not set to happen in some science fiction future many years ahead in our lifetime. We can't wait the five years it took to negotiate Kyoto-we simply don't have the time . . . Without radical measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the next ten to fifteen years, there is compelling evidence to suggest that we might lose the chance to control temperature rises."3 The Stern report came just as the International Energy Agency announced that China, which is commissioning a new coal-fired power plant every five days, will surpass the United States in 2009-nearly a decade ahead of previous predictions-as the world's biggest emitter of carbon dioxide.4 Largely because of China's growth, the Global Carbon Project reported in the November 13, 2006 issue of Nature that "Global carbon emissions are now growing by 3.2 percent a year... That's four times higher than the average annual growth of 0.8 percent from 1990-1999 . . . We are not on any of the stabilization paths." Professor Bill McGuire, director of the Benfield Hazard Research Center in London, said: "This is more very bad news. We need a 60 to 70 percent cut in emissions, but instead, emission levels are spiraling out of control. The sum total of our meager efforts to cut emissions amounts to less than zero."5 The Necessity of Hypocrisy So what sort of "radical measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the next ten to fifteen years" do Blair and Stern propose to stop this onrushing catastrophe? None. After all their rhetoric about impending disaster, the best they could do was call for more "carbon pricing," "more research into new technologies," and "robust international agreements." They specifically rejected mandatory limits on emissions as "too inflexible" and-most crucially-have nothing whatsoever to say about the implications of inexorable growth. On the face of it, this was a completely inadequate response to the crisis, and Blair was immediately chastised by his own party for resisting binding targets.6 After all, carbon pricing schemes, notably in the EU, have already proved to be a colossal failure since economic growth has just barreled through the Kyoto carbon "limits." And what possible technical breakthroughs could cut global CO2 emissions by 60 percent, particularly in the ten-to-fifteen-year timeframe Blair says we must act in order to save ourselves, when China is adding a new coal-fired power plant every week and coal-fired plants are still being built in the United States.7 Nearly everywhere, we see that despite the increased energy efficiency and installation of pollution controls in cars or power plants, without limits to growth these gains are outstripped by ever-increasing production. So instead of CO2 emissions falling, globally emissions are actually accelerating.8 And CO2 emissions are only one-and perhaps not the even the worst-of the oncoming ecological catastrophes we face. Around the world, forests are also vanishing, clean water is disappearing, coral reefs are dying off, species after species is being driven to extinction, resource after resource is being exhausted; everywhere the natural world is being systematically plundered and sacrificed to the god of relentless growth, profits and consumption.9 The Inconvenient Truth Al Gore Does Not Want to Face Blair's contradictions are entirely predictable, rational, and necessary from the standpoint of his capitalist perspective, because the problems he faces are systemic, built into the logic of capitalist economics, and thus unsolvable within the framework of capitalism. The solution to the threat of global warming is obvious: The only way to cut emissions by 60 to 70 percent in the next ten to fifteen years-barring some as yet unknown technical miracle-is by drastically cutting production, output and consumption, particularly in the advanced industrial economies. Al Gore says we face an "inconvenient truth": consume less, conserve more-or die. The problem is the admonition to consume less has to translate into the reality of consuming less-less oil, electricity, steel, aluminum, wood, paper, plastic, fabric, beef, fish, and so on. That, in turn, can only mean producing fewer cars, airplanes, kitchen remodels, fashions, resort vacations, TVs and TV shows, hamburgers and Starbucks Frappuccinos-i.e., converting less of nature into consumable commodities to give a break to the fish, forests, oceans, atmosphere, and all the other natural resources exploited to support the capitalist consumer lifestyle. This is the really inconvenient truth that no investor, labor union, government, mainstream environmental organization, nor anyone of us-including Al Gore-wants to face.10 But this is the truth we have to face if we want to survive. Despite the difficulty such a massive challenge poses, it does not mean that people have to starve. On the contrary, if we do not make these cuts and restructure the global economy, not only will millions soon die from starvation, floods, drought and other catastrophes, but the capitalist engine of ecodestruction will drive humanity to the brink of collapse, if not extinction. The problem is, given the requirements of capitalist reproduction, particularly the need to meet shareholder demands for growing profits, no corporation can cut production and stay in business. Furthermore, any broad effort to slow production and consumption would only bring on market collapse and economic depression. So, as long as Blair, Stern, Al Gore, and the rest of the corporate and political elite are committed to maintaining and perpetuating global capitalism as their first and foremost priority, they have no choice but to subordinate the environment to growth and consumption, override their own environmental targets, turn themselves into hypocrites, and doom the future of humanity. To imagine, as they do, that technical innovations, carbon taxes, "green shopping" and the like will allow production and consumption to spiral endlessly upward and consume evermore resources while pollution and emissions spiral downward is to live in a delusional dreamworld of faith-based economics that has no empirical basis.11 Through most of human history up to around the 17th century, humanity suffered from class structures that put brakes on productivity growth, institutionalized underproduction as a regular feature of economic life, and so brought on periodic famines and demographic collapse. But since the advent of the capitalist mode of production, humanity has both benefited-but also increasingly suffered-from the opposite problem: crises and consequences of overproduction, which have typically taken the form of economic crashes and depression. Today, this engine of relentless technological revolution and productivity growth has built an economy of such power, capacity and scale that it is systematically destroying the very ecological basis of human life. The Smithian Operating System To understand why the free market can't solve our global environmental crisis, the place to start is with an examination of the logic and contradictions of capitalist economics-the economics of Adam Smith. Needless to say, Smith can't be held responsible for the problems and consequences of capitalist development. But Smith's economic theory is a metonym - the language of capitalism, its intellectual "operating system." For it was Smith, the original and foremost theorist of capitalism, who first discovered and elaborated the organizing principle of capitalist economic life, which he famously termed the "invisible hand." Smith found it remarkable that in what he called "commercial society" (what we today call capitalism), no one looks out for the "general welfare" of society as such. Yet somehow, the provision of the necessities of life-e.g., enough food, clothes, housing, and transportation-so that society can carry on from day-to-day and year-to-year seems to more or less unconsciously get taken care of. In some of the most famous phrases in all of economic literature Smith asserted: In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it grows up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want . . . and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages . . . (Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter 1, p. 14.)12 And again that: Every individual . . . neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it . . . He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. (Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter II, p. 423.)13 Smith's insight, one of the most powerful and elegant concepts in the history of capitalist economics, grasps the essence of the market system-namely, production for exchange, specialized division of labor, and mutual dependence of all producers/commodity sellers/consumers upon one another through the market. This is what distinguishes the market system from all previous economic systems, such as communal tribal society, slavery, and feudalism-all of which were, in one way or another, systems based overwhelmingly on direct production for use rather than for exchange. For example, in pre-capitalist economic systems like medieval agrarian Europe, farm production was planned and largely for direct use. The basic unit of rural production was the peasant family with its farm, rudimentary tools and livestock. Peasant farmers not only grew their own food but often made their own clothes, fabricated most of their own tools, and built their own houses. Peasants produced mostly for subsistence and, where they were enserfed, to pay rents to feudal landlords, tithes to the church, and sometimes additional obligations to the state. Beyond this, those who could produce and retain some surplus over subsistence, rent, and tithe obligations sold it in local town markets to procure the few necessities they could not produce for themselves on the farm or in the lord's demesne shops, such as metal for plows or tools. In the villages, patriarchal family households organized the day-to-day operations of farm life, determining which crops to grow and when, and assigning a division of labor within the family. They planned this production based on their foreknowledge of what their family unit needed to carry on from year-to-year-how much and what kinds of crops and animals to raise, and how much labor to devote to farming, husbandry, and building upkeep. More often than not, because village agricultural regimes required village-wide cooperation to regulate seasonal plantings, field rotations, harvest, and commons management, peasant farmers collectively planned and regulated their seasonal work rhythms in cooperation with their neighbors according to the custom and village bylaws in tightknit village communities. Throughout Europe, most rural agrarian output was directly consumed on the farm, in the hamlets and villages. The feudal aristocracy consumed the surpluses directly and marketed some of their surpluses in urban markets to purchase luxury goods and military equipment. In short, rural Europe, at least up to the 15th century, was in a sense a "planned" economy-or more precisely, consisted of masses of miniature planned village economies.14 By Adam Smith's day in the late 18th century, rural peasant village self-sufficiency with its limited division of labor had largely given way to generalized production for market throughout England and parts of Western Europe. In this new "commercial" economy, Smith observed there is no general economic "plan." No one plans production for the self-sufficient family anymore. Production is now specialized and geared for the whole society-and it is to society that one must turn to satisfy one's own needs. No one knows how much wheat or wool, how many shoes, coats, ships, or wagons society needs, or when they are needed. No one consciously divides up and assigns society's labor to the various tasks of producing all that society requires over any given period of time.15 And yet out of the unconscious "mindlessness" of this system, a spontaneous order emerges. Society seems to be "guided by an invisible hand" to produce more or less of these goods so that we can carry on from day-to-day to ensure social reproduction. By the developing 18th-century capitalist economy of Adam Smith's era, most producers no longer possessed their own means of subsistence, or at least full subsistence. Masses of peasant farmers had been cleared off the land and proletarianized by centuries of enclosure movements. Peasant subsistence farms, with all their variety of produce, had been replaced with wheat farms or sheep folds. The hand loom weaver, village blacksmith and most small-scale hand manufacturers were giving way to large-scale factory production with a specialized division of labor and, increasingly in the late 18th century, mechanization. Without full access to the means of subsistence, everyone in capitalist society must specialize to produce a commodity for market or sell their labor power to work for an employer who does possess the means of production.16 So to win one's own bread in the capitalist organization of production, virtually everyone, including the capitalists, must continuously sell their specialized commodity on the market in order to continuously purchase their own means of subsistence and the means of production to re-enter production.17 In this way, all commodity producers/sellers are dependent upon the labor of others.18 How do these specialist commodity producers/sellers know in advance how much of their particular commodity-wheat, cloth, bricks, horseshoes, board feet of lumber, barrels, etc.-society "needs" in any given year or how much they will sell? They don't. Typically they estimate from what they sold the previous year, and hope to sell their product for at least as low a price as others offering the same commodity. Thus, society's "need" for any particular commodity is determined after the fact by the price at which it sells, what Smith called "effectual demand." If demand and prices are high for some particular commodity, Smith says producers will "employ more labor and stock in preparing and bringing it to market." If demand falls, producers will "withdraw a part of their labor or stock from this employment" and redeploy those resources in some other line of production.19 So if the market is glutted with wheat, but wool is in short supply and prices are high, some farmers will turn to raising sheep. If demand is low for ships but high for houses, some carpenters will switch from building ships to building houses. And so on, until the supply and demand come roughly into balance, what economists today call "equilibrium."20 That's the beauty and efficiency of the market system, as mainstream economists never tire of telling us. Engine of Development: Production for Exchange and its Imperatives This mutual dependence of each and every person through the market entrains a number of powerful implications. Foremost among these are the implications that flow from competition in the marketplace. Commodity sellers don't have the freedom to charge what they wish, because they must be able to sell at prices close to the competition if they are to compete. The specific strategies and methods producers must adopt to survive against the competition shape the overall pattern of economic development of capitalism as a system and also distinguish it from every other economic system: Producers must strive to cut the cost of inputs, which means seeking out ever-cheaper sources of raw materials and labor. Producers must continuously increase the efficiency of their units of production by innovating, bringing in more advanced labor-saving machinery to boost productivity, and substituting newer and cheaper raw materials inputs. So unlike the ruling classes of pre-capitalist economies, capitalists are not free to consume their surpluses in conspicuous consumption but must reinvest much of their profits back into productivity-enhancing technologies and skills to develop the forces of production. Competition compels producers to strive to grow by maximizing sales, expanding existing markets, seeking out and creating new markets and commodities-or see them developed by the competition, and thus see their stock value fall as the penalty for complacency. As eloquent as Adam Smith was, no one captured the broader developmental implications of capitalist economics better than Karl Marx. In some of the most prescient phrases in all of economic literature, Marx wrote in his Communist Manifesto: The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society ... Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned . . . The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground - what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?21 By comparison, pre-capitalist modes of production contained no such engine of development or drive to "constantly revolutionize" the instruments and relations of production. Technological advance under slavery and feudalism was agonizingly slow, and economic stagnation was the norm. When productivity growth could not keep pace with population growth, economic collapse and famine followed. Even the Stalinist bureaucratic mode of production in Russia and China contained no such built-in drive to development. Post-revolutionary Russia and China rapidly developed and industrialized to a considerable extent, but the bureaucratic system was not powered by any self-active motor. Development depended entirely on the conscious actions and direction of central planners, but for the same reason, it was also severely limited and handicapped by the bureaucracy's inability to push development beyond certain limits. In particular, these bureaucrats lacked the weapons of unemployment and bankruptcy to discipline producers, force productivity increases, or generate innovation and development.22 Without competition to force producers to innovate and become more efficient, top-down bureaucratically driven development was no match for the dynamic growth of global capitalism. This engine of development has brought the most prodigious development of the forces of production of any mode of production in history, lifting the living standards of billions of people the world over. So it was no surprise that since the spectacular collapse of communism and the global triumph of capitalism in the 1990s, Smithian economics has been crowned with a sacred halo, unquestioned and self-evident to the churched.23 Today, Smith's theory, rebranded for today's market under the neoclassical and neoliberal labels, is entrenched in every economics department from Berkeley to Beijing. Engine of Planetary Eco-collapse: The Collective Irrationality of Individualist Economics In his 1996 book The Future of Capitalism, Lester Thurow lucidly captured the socially suicidal aggregate impact of individualistic economic decision-making: Nowhere is capitalism's time horizon problem more acute than in the area of global environmentalism .. . What should a capitalistic society do about long-run environmental problems such as global warming or ozone depletion? . .. Using capitalist decision rules, the answer to what should be done today to prevent such problems is very clear-do nothing. However large the negative effects fifty to one hundred years from now might be, their current discounted net present value is zero. If the current value of the future negative consequences are zero, then nothing should be spent today to prevent those distant problems from emerging. But if the negative effects are very large fifty to one hundred years from now, by then it will be too late to do anything to make the situation any better, since anything done at that time could only improve the situation another fifty to one hundred years into the future. So being good capitalists, those who live in the future, no matter how bad their problems are, will also decide to do nothing. Eventually a generation will arrive which cannot survive in the earth's altered environment, but by then it will be too late for them to do anything to prevent their own extinction. Each generation makes good capitalist decisions, yet the net effect is collective social suicide.24 Lester Thurow, virtually alone among mainstream economists as near as I can tell, has recognized this potentially fatal contradiction of capitalism-even though he is no anti-capitalist and wrote the book from which this excerpt is drawn in the hopes of finding a future for capitalism. Until very recently, the standard economics textbooks ignored the problem of the environment altogether. Even today, the standard Economics 101 textbooks of Baro, Mankiv and other mainstream economists contain almost no mention of environment or ecology.25 This reflects the increasingly rightward drift of the discipline since the 1970s. The American economics profession has long since abandoned the practice of critical scientific thought and seriously considering dissenting views. Today, an almost totalitarian "neoliberal" religious dogma rules the discipline. Keynesianism, social democracy, and Marxism are dismissed as hopelessly antiquated. Ecological economics is considered suspect. And the prudent graduate student is well advised to steer clear of all such interests if he or she wants to find a job.26 As Francis Fukuyama put it some years back, history has reached its penultimate apogee in free market capitalism and liberal democracy. The science of economics, Fukuyama pronounced, was "settled" with Adam Smith's accomplishment. The future would bring no more than "endless technical adjustments;" thus no further theoretical thought is required."27

## 3

#### Engagement isn’t appeasement

Resnick 1 (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301>)

Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

#### **The AFF is appeasement**

Barros et. al 9 (Andrew, Associate Professor of History at the University of Quebec in Montreal, Canada, Debating British Decisionmaking toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s, 2009, <http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/2009%20IS%201930s%20correspondence.pdf>)

Conventional definitions of appeasement generally emphasize the use of concessions to satisfy the adversary’s grievances, reduce tensions, and avoid war for the foreseeable future. We argued that these definitions narrowly equate appeasement with the dominant interpretation of British and French appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s and neglect other forms of appeasement. They also fail to distinguish appeasement from other influence strategies involving concessions. These concerns led us to propose an alternative definition of appeasement as “a strategy of sustained, asymmetrical concessions in response to a threat, with the aim of avoiding war, at least in the short term” (p. 154). We then distinguished three different types of appeasement strategies, based on the goals and expectations of the appeaser: (1) “resolving grievances” to create a lasting peace; (2) “diffusing secondary threats” to focus on a primary threat—by conserving resources, denying the primary adversary an important ally, or perhaps redirecting the hostility of the secondary threat toward the primary threat; and (3) “buying time” to prepare for (and perhaps deter) a possible military confrontation by rearming or securing allies. We used this typology to distinguish our buying-time interpretation of British appeasement policy toward Nazi Germany from a standard resolving grievances interpretation.

#### “Increase” means net increase

Words and Phrases 8(v. 20a, p. 264-265)

Cal.App.2 Dist. 1991. Term “increase,” as used in statute giving the Energy Commission modification jurisdiction over any alteration, replacement, or improvement of equipment that results in “increase” of 50 megawatts or more in electric generating capacity of existing thermal power plant, refers to “net increase” in power plant’s total generating capacity; in deciding whether there has been the requisite 50-megawatt increase as a result of new units being incorporated into a plant, Energy Commission cannot ignore decreases in capacity caused by retirement or deactivation of other units at plant. West’s Ann.Cal.Pub.Res.Code § 25123.

Vote NEG

1. Limits – justifies removing small restrictions on all countries which explodes limits – theyre key to clash

2. Ground – not increasing economic engagement means we don’t have any DA links because they aren’t specific to economic and they don’t increase it

## 4

#### Syria authorization will pass – Obama’s full court press key to undecided voters

Chicago Tribune 9/6

“Syria crisis: Obama plans 'full-court press' to sway Congress” [http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-syria-conflict-20130906,0,1469446,full.story]

WASHINGTON— President Barack Obama will take his case for military action in Syria directly to the American people next week, stepping up his campaign to convince a deeply skeptical Congress to back strikes against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces. Obama's address to the nation from the White House on Tuesday will be part of a rejuvenated lobbying effort on Syria as Congress returns to Washington next week. A Democratic congressional aide said the administration is planning "a full-court press" aimed at undecided lawmakers. Speaking in Russia at the conclusion of the G20 summit, Obama acknowledged on Friday he faces an uphill fight to build public and congressional support for a military response to the Syrian government's alleged use of chemical weapons. Early vote counts in Congress do not look encouraging for Obama, with scores of lawmakers still undecided about whether to authorize a military strike after the president said last week he would seek their approval. Opinion polls show a war-weary public strongly opposes U.S. action in Syria. "In terms of the votes and the process in Congress, I knew this was going to be a heavy lift," Obama told reporters in St. Petersburg. "I understand the skepticism. I think it is very important, therefore, for us to work through, systematically, making the case to every senator and every member of Congress. And that's what we're doing," he said. Administration officials have given public testimony and daily closed-door briefings on Syria this week to members of Congress, who remain concerned that even limited strikes could draw the United States into a prolonged war and spark broader hostilities in the region. The briefings will resume on Monday, and the White House hopes support will grow as more members of Congress get classified briefings. Democratic House Leader Nancy Pelosi, known for her ability to gather votes in her caucus, told Democrats in a letter on Friday there would be two meetings next week of Democratic members with White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough. "There will be a full-court press from the administration and those undecided Democratic members in particular are going to be getting multiple calls from administration officials, including the president," a Democratic Senate aide said. "Every undecided vote is going to get a lot of attention from both the leader (Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid) and from the White House," the aide said. According to a Washington Post count, only 23 senators have been willing to go on record in favor of military force, while 17 are against. It will likely take 60 of the Senate's 100 members to advance the measure to the House of Representatives. In the House, where 218 votes will be required to pass the resolution, only 25 members are on record in support of military action so far, according to the Post, with 106 opposed. Democratic aides who support strikes have dismissed the numbers as meaningless, saying many lawmakers have not attended any classified briefings. Others noted lawmakers often wait until the last minute to decide, in part because they want to see what others are going to do.

#### Drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven, likely in future and specifically true for Rubio – Cuba policy is totally unique – this is the best link card you will ever read

LeoGrande, 12 William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### PC is key – approval requires it

Brown et al 9-4 – White House reporter who focuses on the intersection of policy and politics in the administration and on Capitol Hill. She has covered the Senate, the 2008 Obama campaign, the health care overhaul bill, Wall Street reform and various tax cut battles in Congress. (Carrie, Jake Sherman covers Congress for POLITICO, “President Obama’s political capital spreads thin”, September 4 of 2013, <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/obamas-political-capital-spreads-thin-96306.html>)

President Barack Obama faced a heavy lift in Congress this fall when his agenda included only budget issues and immigration reform. Now with Syria in the mix, the president appears ready to spend a lot of the political capital that he would have kept in reserve for his domestic priorities. A resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria won’t make it through the House or the Senate without significant cajoling from the White House. That means Obama, who struggles to get Congress to follow his lead on almost everything, could burn his limited leverage convincing Democrats and Republicans to vote for an unpopular military operation that even the president says he could carry out with or without their approval. “The only effect is — and I don’t mean this to be dismissive in any way — it will be taking up some time and there be some degree of political capital expended by all,” said Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), the Foreign Relations Committee ranking member who helped draft the Senate resolution. “At the end of the day, it’s a tough vote for anybody because the issue is trying to draft an authorization knowing that they’re going to implement it.” The West Wing says it’s too early to know how Obama’s surprise decision to seek congressional authorization will affect the rest of his agenda, but his advisers are betting that a win could usher in other domestic successes. A failed vote, however, would undoubtedly weaken him. A senior administration official said the effort could build some trust between the White House and Republicans that might ease tensions in negotiations over the budget and other issues. White House aides have long argued that success begets success. Their latest test of that theory was the broad bipartisan Senate vote for comprehensive immigration reform bill, which was supposed to compel the House to act. So far, it has not — and House Republicans don’t think the Syria vote will be any different.

#### Intervention in Syria deters WMD use globally—solves multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict

Fitzpatrick 9-6 Mark, Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program, International Institute for Strategic Studies; “Obama's "altruistic" Syria intervention enhances deterrence against WMD” *Global Post*; September 6, 2013; http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/130906/obamas-altruistic-syria-intervention-enhances-deterren

The impending U.S. intervention in Syria is a rare case of a major power taking action against its will in order to uphold a greater good: the protection of [hu]mankind against weapons of mass destruction. There is no other ulterior motive. Obama's objective is not to remove Syrian leader Bahar al-Assad or to reverse his gains in the civil war; it is simply to penalise him for violating a universal prohibition and thereby deter further use. The airstrike reprisals foreshadowed by the United States and France, which are to be strictly limited and proportional to the crime, could thus be called an act of altruism. The evidence is now compelling that Assad's forces indiscriminately fired chemical weapons on a large scale, killing hundreds of children and other civilians. The leaders of the free world cannot let this deed go unanswered. Throughout the past year, as the Syrian death count mounted and atrocities multiplied, Obama resisted calls from both sides of the political spectrum for action against Assad. The small-scale use of chemical weapons in March and April and probably on earlier occasions in 2012 could not be conclusively pinned on the Assad regime. Having extricated the United States from wars in Iraq and, soon, Afghanistan, Obama was also rightly cautious about not getting stuck in another Middle East conflict with no good options and no clear exit strategy. The growing role of Al Qaeda-associated fighters in the Syrian civil war increased Obama's reluctance to weigh in in ways that could strengthen these groups. The need to make clear to Assad and to the world, however, that use of chemical weapons will not again be tolerated trumped other considerations. Other rogue state leaders such as Kim Jong-un are also on notice. North Korea probably has the world's third largest stockpile of chemical weapons and will be number one in this notorious regard as the U.S. and Russia continue their destruction of Cold War stockpiles. North Korea will have greater reason to think twice about ever attacking anyone with those weapons. The Syria action also enhances the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence against nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons have little in common with nuclear weapons except that both have been categorised by the United Nations as weapons of mass destruction. The term is overused, but it has some relevance in this case. Any nation that uses such weapons or violates treaty obligations against developing them will pay a painful price. There is also a lesson here for Iran. The punishment meted out to Assad is not intended to give his ally a black eye. But Iran should take notice that the Western powers will take military action when WMD redlines have been crossed. Let us hope that under its new president, Iran will follow through on hints of willingness to curb its nuclear programme.

## 5

#### The plan causes economic overheating

Robert David Cruz 03 (current qualifications: PhD., Chief economist for Miami-Dade County) “Foreign Direct Investment in Post-Castro Cuba: Problems, Opportunities and Recommendations,” University of Miami, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, Pg. 20, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research\_Studies/RDCruz.pdf

The appropriate U.S. role during an economic transition is not to promote FDI in Cuba per se, but rather to help establish the foundation for a successful and rapid transition to a market economy and representative democracy. Market forces will direct FDI to Cuba as a result of the transition, the establishment of a stable democracy, and the inherent long term strengths of the Cuban economy. With such a foundation in place, Cuba will attract a significant share of the region’s flow of FDI as the risk adjusted rates of return to FDI in Cuba are likely to be markedly higher than in other parts of the region during the short- and medium-run following the start of transition. Investment flows attracted solely or primarily by U.S. financial incentives without developing the foundation for long-term growth will have only transitory effects and be unsustainable in the longer run. Nonetheless, there are U.S. policy actions that can facilitate economic transition and help to ensure its success and durability. If a transition to democracy occurs quickly, then Cuba will need almost immediate access to the expertise and information required to take appropriate economic policy actions. The U.S. should be ready to assist Cuba during such a period by compiling a library of professional studies, academic articles, literature surveys, news articles and interviews directly related to the challenges of economic transition and public policy. The U.S. should also assist in the creation of a directory of experts in the various fields of economic transition and development (for example: macroeconomic policy, international trade policy, financial and commercial institution building, legal system and judiciary, privatization, small business development, and civil society). This directory of experts could be used to assemble a team of advisors in key policy areas. These actions would build a knowledge base that a Cuban government could easily access during the early phase of economic transition. Under the appropriate business and regulatory environment, Cuba can expect a flood of new U.S. tourists drawn away from other Caribbean destinations (and away from Florida’s coastal destinations as well), and re-routing of cruise-ship itineraries. Similarly the growth and development of export zones in a Cuba embarked on economic transition may very well lead to a shift in FDI from Caribbean nations. These developments may have significant detrimental effects on the economy of some of the U.S.’s Caribbean trading partners (and perhaps, Southeast Florida as well). The U.S. should be ready to mitigate these negative economic impacts in the short- and medium run. It would be a mistake for the U.S. to adopt special fiscal incentives (tax breaks or subsidies) for U.S. companies that invest in Cuba, as this would lead to an artificial competitive advantage that may later be difficult to dismantle. Instead, the U.S. should assist Cuba in ways that strengthen the foundation of a market economy. As earlier suggested, the primary focus of U.S. policy toward Cuba during a transition to democracy and a market economy should be: 1) facilitate technical assistance in the area of economic policy, and in strengthening structures of governance and civil society; 2) provide financial assistance necessary to attain macroeconomic stability; and 3) lead a multilateral effort to provide the financing needed to rebuild physical infrastructure in ways that promote economic development that is spread across the island.

#### That causes democratic backsliding and regional prolif

Schulz 00 (Donald Schulz, Chairman of the Political Science Department at Cleveland State University, March 2000, The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub31.pdf)

A second major interest is the promotion of democracy. At first glance, this might appear to be a peripheral concern. For much of its history, the United States was perfectly comfortable with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, so long as they did not threaten higher priority interests like regional security or U.S. economic holdings. But that is no longer the case. U.S. values have changed; democracy has been elevated to the status of an "important" interest. In part, this has been because American leaders have gained a greater appreciation of the role of legitimacy as a source of political stability. Governments that are popularly elected and respect human rights and the rule of law are less dangerous to both their citizens and their neighbors. Nations which are substantively democratic tend not to go to war with one another. They are also less vulnerable to the threat of internal war provoked, in part, by government violence and illegality.(5) In short, democracy and economic integration are not simply value preferences, but are increasingly bound up with hemispheric security. To take just one example: The restoration of democracy in Brazil and Argentina and their increasingly strong and profitable relationship in Mercosur have contributed in no small degree to their decisions to foresake the development of nuclear weapons. Perceptions of threat have declined, and perceptions of the benefits of cooperation have grown, and this has permitted progress on a range of security issues from border disputes, to peacekeeping, environmental protection, counternarcotics, and the combat of organized crime.¶ CONTINUES¶ Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each other—most notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency—and have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: • . . the military application of Brazil’s nuclear and space programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazil’s nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55 Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first p1ace.) In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify it’s existence. One obvious candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers.57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amaazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the hemisphere.

#### Prolif causes extinction – escalation

Kroenig 12 – Matthew Kroenig is an Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations, May 26th, 2012, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” <http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30>

What’s Wrong with Proliferation Optimism?

**The proliferation optimist position**, while having a distinguished pedigree, **has several major flaws**. Many of these weaknesses have been chronicled in brilliant detail by Scott Sagan and other contemporary proliferation pessimists.34 Rather than repeat these substantial efforts, I will use this section to offer some original critiques of the recent incarnations of proliferation optimism.¶ First and foremost, proliferation optimists do not appear to understand contemporary deterrence theory. I do not say this lightly in an effort to marginalize or discredit my intellectual opponents. Rather, I make this claim with all due caution and sincerity. A careful review of the contemporary proliferation optimism literature does not reflect an understanding of, or engagement with, the developments in academic deterrence theory over the past few decades in top scholarly journals such as the American Political Science Review and International Organization.35 While early optimists like Viner and Brodie can be excused for not knowing better, the writings of contemporary proliferation optimists **ignore much of the past fifty years of academic research on nuclear deterrence theory.**¶In the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple understanding.36 After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons. And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.37 And, unfortunately for proliferation optimists, the answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic.¶ Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.38 He argued that leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”39 They can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war before backing down will win the crisis as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a “competition in risk taking.”¶ 40 This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange.¶ Since 1945 there were have been many high stakes nuclear crises (by my count, there have been twenty) in which “rational” states like the United States run a frighteningly-real risk of nuclear war.41 By asking whether states can be deterred or not, therefore, proliferation optimists ask the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power. It is also inconceivable that in those circumstances, Iran would not be willing to run any risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over, for example, the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client Hezbollah, the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, passage through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly even brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to coerce its adversaries? If the latter, there is a real risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war.¶ An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used, even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used. But, this objection ignores the fact that **leaders operate under competing pressures.** Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have very strong incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons could very well be used. Historically we have seen that leaders take actions in crises, such as **placing nuclear weapons on** high alert **and** delegating **nuclear** launch authority **to low level commanders**, to purposely increase the risk of accidental nuclear war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down.

## Econ

#### Lifting the embargo destroys Cuban ag

Gonzalez 3 – Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law (Carmen, “SEASONS OF RESISTANCE: SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN CUBA”, Summer of 2003, book p. 729-33)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external – the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era. It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path. Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions. Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union. Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.n413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time. It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cuban sovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.n416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries. Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers – as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century. Cuba is once again at a crossroads – as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans. The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation. The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation.

#### Extinction

Ehrlich & Ehrlich 13 – Professor of Biology & Senior Research Scientist in Biology @ Stanford University (Paul R. Ehrlich (President of the Center for Conservation Biology @ Stanford University) & Anne H. Ehrlich, “Can a collapse of global civilization be avoided?,” Proceedings of the Royal Society Biological Sciences, Proc. R. Soc. B 2013 280, published online 9 January 2013)//HA

¶ Virtually every past civilization has eventually undergone collapse, a loss of socio-political-economic complexity usually accompanied by a dramatic decline in population size [1]. Some, such as those of Egypt and China, have recovered from collapses at various stages; others, such as that of Easter Island or the Classic Maya, were apparently permanent [1,2]. All those previous collapses were local or regional; elsewhere, other societies and civilizations persisted unaffected. Sometimes, as in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, new civilizations rose in succession. In many, if not most, cases, overexploitation of the environment was one proximate or an ultimate cause [3].¶ But today, for the first time, humanity’s global civilization—the worldwide, increasingly interconnected, highly technological society in which we all are to one degree or another, embedded—is threatened with collapse by an array of environmental problems. Humankind finds itself engaged in what Prince Charles described as ‘an act of suicide on a grand scale’ [4], facing what the UK’s Chief Scientific Advisor John Beddington called a ‘perfect storm’ of environmental problems [5]. The most serious of these problems show signs of rapidly escalating severity, especially climate disruption. But other elements could potentially also contribute to a collapse: an accelerating extinction of animal and plant populations and species, which could lead to a loss of ecosystem services essential for human survival; land degradation and land-use change; a pole-to-pole spread of toxic compounds; ocean acidification and eutrophication (dead zones); worsening of some aspects of the epidemiological environment (factors that make human populations susceptible to infectious diseases); depletion of increasingly scarce resources [6,7], including especially groundwater, which is being overexploited in many key agricultural areas [8]; and resource wars [9]. These are not separate problems; rather they interact in two gigantic complex adaptive systems: the biosphere system and the human socio-economic system. The negative manifestations of these interactions are often referred to as ‘the human predicament’ [10], and determining how to prevent it from generating a global collapse is perhaps the foremost challenge confronting humanity.¶ The human predicament is driven by overpopulation, overconsumption of natural resources and the use of unnecessarily environmentally damaging technologies and socio-economic-political arrangements to service Homo sapiens’ aggregate consumption [11–17]. How far the human population size now is above the planet’s long-term carrying capacity is suggested (conservatively) by ecological footprint analysis [18–20]. It shows that to support today’s population of seven billion sustainably (i.e. with business as usual, including current technologies and standards of living) would require roughly half an additional planet; to do so, if all citizens of Earth consumed resources at the US level would take four to five more Earths. Adding the projected 2.5 billion more people by 2050 would make the human assault on civilization’s life-support systems disproportionately worse, because almost everywhere people face systems with nonlinear responses [11,21–23], in which environmental damage increases at a rate that becomes faster with each additional person. Of course, the claim is often made that humanity will expand Earth’s carrying capacity dramatically with technological innovation [24], but it is widely recognized that technologies can both add and subtract from carrying capacity. The plough evidently first expanded it and now appears to be reducing it [3]. Overall, careful analysis of the prospects does not provide much confidence that technology will save us [25] or that gross domestic product can be disengaged from resource use [26] ¶ 2. Do current trends portend a collapse?¶ What is the likelihood of this set of interconnected predicaments [27] leading to a global collapse in this century? There have been many definitions and much discussion of past ‘collapses’ [1,3,28–31], but a future global collapse does not require a careful definition. It could be triggered by anything from a ‘small’ nuclear war, whose ecological effects could quickly end civilization [32], to a more gradual breakdown because famines, epidemics and resource shortages cause a disintegration of central control within nations, in concert with disruptions of trade and conflicts over increasingly scarce necessities. In either case, regardless of survivors or replacement societies, the world familiar to anyone reading this study and the well-being of the vast majority of people would disappear. pg. 1-2

#### Cuban growth inevitable – only a question of US benefits

Iwata 6 (Edward, writer for USA Today, “Cuba’s Economic Fate Up in the Air”, USA Today, 8/28/06, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/world/2006-08-27-cuba-economy\_x.htm)

Despite the hope of U.S. companies that Cuba might welcome capitalism and that the U.S. might lift its long-running embargo, dramatic change probably won't happen soon. Raul Castro is unlikely to anger Cuba's ruling elite by launching major economic reforms, economists and Cuba scholars predict.¶ "If Fidel dies, the grip of the military would be even greater than now," says Antonio Jorge, an economist at Florida International University. "Raul would buy the loyalty of generals and high-ranking officials by showering them with more privileges and economic benefits."¶ Talk of Cuba's economic fate comes amid reports of Fidel Castro's intestinal surgery earlier this month and the transfer of power to his brother. The news fueled speculation that Castro might die, setting off street celebrations among Miami's large Cuban population.¶ The stakes remain high: billions of dollars in future trade and investments and 11 million potential Cuban consumers only 90 miles from Florida. Economists say that U.S. failure to tap into the Cuban economy will benefit only leftist Venezuela and communist China, Cuba's biggest trade partners.¶ "Cuba is an evolving and dramatic new market," says Ruben Bonilla, chairman of the Port of Corpus Christi in Texas. "We don't want to miss the party because of an embargo begun 10 U.S. presidents ago."¶ Venezuela supplies Cuba with half of its oil, shipping 78,000 barrels of crude oil daily at subsidized prices. China imports nickel from Cuba and has signed a spate of business deals with the Castros.¶ Both countries are likely to grow closer to Cuba. It has potential crude oil reserves of up to 9 billion barrels and vast natural gas reserves, reports the U.S. Geological Survey. Already, Cuba has signed lease agreements with China, India, Canada and Spain.¶ U.S.-Cuba relations have been rocky since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. A 44-year U.S. trade embargo bans nearly all exports to Cuba except agricultural and medical goods. Anti-communists say the Castro regime must fall before the embargo is lifted, while pro-trade forces say impoverished Cuba needs capitalism.¶ In spite of the embargo, U.S. businesses — especially in agriculture, shipping, oil and energy, tourism, retail, finance and construction — hope a new ruler might lead to a new Cuban economy.¶ After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, U.S. companies wanted to rush into Cuba, thinking it would be the next Soviet bloc country to fall, says Jaime Suchlicki, director of the University of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. That didn't happen.¶ "Now," says Suchlicki, "it's beginning to pick up again because it looks like there might be change."

#### There is no bioterrorist threat. The most sophisticated terrorist group ever tried attacking with a biological agent 9 times and the attacks were so bad no one even noticed they were happening.

**Mueller, 05** (John, Professor of Political Science at OhioState. May 2005. International Studies Perspectives, Volume 6 Issue 2 Page 208-234, Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration)

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could indeed, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used even though the knowledge about their destructive potential as weapons goes back decades, even centuries in some respects (the English, e.g., made some efforts to spread smallpox among American Indians in the French and Indian War) (Christopher, Cieslak, Pavlin, and Eitzen, 1997:412).Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason: biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and to control. Terrorist groups or rogue states may be able to solve such problems in the future with advances in technology and knowledge, but the record thus far is unlikely to be very encouraging to them. For example, Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during the Second World War. These ventures may have killed thousands of Chinese, but they apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese troops and seem to have had little military impact.18 In the 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult that had some 300 scientists in its employ and an estimated budget of $1 billion, reportedly tried at least nine times over 5 years to set off biological weapons by spraying pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops, hoping fancifully to ignite an apocalyptic war. These efforts failed to create a single fatality—in fact, nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place.

## Relations

#### US decline will not spark wars

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

#### War is impossible – Chinese democratization will facilitate cooperation

**Friedberg, 05** (Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3002\_pp007-045\_friedberg.pdf)

Liberal optimists believe that, although it is still far from finished, the process of democratization is already well under way in China.20 This process is being driven largely by economic development, which, in turn, is being accelerated by China’s increasing openness to trade. Rising per capita incomes are creating a growing Chinese middle class. In Europe and North America, and more recently in Asia, those whose rising incomes allow them to do more than attend to the struggle for daily existence have been the prime movers behind progress toward democracy, and there is every reason to hope that they will play a similar role in China.21 Liberals also believe that, in addition to stirring the desire for political rights, economic development creates an objective, functional need for political liberalization. Without courts, contracts, and a reliable rule of law, economic progress will surely falter. Moreover, in an era in which sustained growth depends increasingly on free flows of information, regimes that seek to restrict speech and control communications will be at a fatal disadvantage. Over time, if it wishes even to approach the levels of well-being already attained by its advanced industrial counterparts (all of which are democracies), China too must become democratic.22 As it does, the liberal optimists expect that its relations with the United States will stabilize and that, ultimately, it will enter into the democratic “zone of peace.” Although the process may take time fully to unfold, before too long open conflict between the United States and a democratic China will be as improbable as war among the members of the European Union appears to be today.

#### Chinese Sphere of Influence is key to aerospace, biotech, and nuclear power.

**Wise 09** (Carol, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, 2009, “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores,” http://es.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/02/19/es.kht015.full)//DR. H

At the same time, as China’s commercial and political relationship with the countries in the region continues to grow, so will the influence of Chinese communities, businesses, and organizations now present in Latin America. Here, a good deal of diplomatic footwork remains to be done on both sides. Ellis cites the numerous conflicts between Chinese oil companies and indigenous groups, Ecuador being a prime example; the Argentine truck drivers’ strike against Chinese shop owners in 2006 is cited as further evidence of a troublesome trend underway in the region. The question of China’s ability to continue treading lightly with the United States is another potential problem. China’s improvement of its military capabilities through the acquisition of new technology is now a reality, as is the PRC’s willingness to form partnerships with various Latin American countries in this realm. This development is likely to be met with increased uneasiness in the United States, as is China’s propensity to increase technology cooperation in areas such as aerospace, biotechnology, and nuclear power.

#### No impact to cred

**Miller ‘10** [February 3rd, 2010, Aaron David, public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Princeton University, Foreign Policy, “The End of Diplomacy?” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/03/the\_end\_of\_diplomacy?page=full]

Back in the day, there was a time when American diplomacy did big and important things. No more**,** it seems. The world's gotten complicated, America is a good deal weaker, andthe U.S. administration is handicapping itself with a dysfunctional bureaucratic setup that makes it harder to focus and find its footing. Effective American diplomacy may well be going the way of the dodo, and the sad fact is there may be little Barack Obama can do about it. Lamenting the absence of great men years before his own shining moment, Winston Churchill wrote that in England, once upon a time, "there were wonderful giants of old." There's always a danger in idealizing what once was or seemed to be in order to make a point about the present. Still, looking back over the last 60 years, you really do have to wonder whether America's best diplomacy and foreign policy are behind it. America never ran the world (an illusion the left, right, and much of the third and fourth worlds believe; but there were moments (1945-1950, the early 1970s, 1988-1991) when the United States marshaled its military, political, and economic power toward impressive ends. There were, or course, disasters and plenty of dysfunction during these years, including the Vietnam War and out-of-control CIA operations. But there were also brilliant achievements: the Marshall Plan, NATO, effective Arab-Israeli diplomacy, détente with the Russians, opening to China, a competent American role in the acceleration and management of the end of the Cold War, and the first Gulf War. For most of the last 16 years, however -- under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush -- America has been in a diplomatic dry patch. In the face of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, wars of choice, and nasty regional conflicts, conventional diplomacy has either not been tried or not been very successful. The image of the shuttling secretary of state pre-empting crises or exploiting them to broker agreements, doggedly pursuing Middle East peace, achieving dramatic breakthroughs with spectacular secret diplomacy seems a world away. The Obama administration wants to do this kind of stuff. And it has done pretty well in managing the big relationships with Russia and Europe, though it has had its share of problems with China. But frankly, these are the easy ones. It's not from the big that the president's problems come; it's from the small**.** In garden spots like Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the problems are four parts military, five parts nation-building, and maybe one part diplomacy**.** AndAmerica is unlikely to prevail in any meaningful sense of the word where corrupt, extractive regimes are unable to control their own territory and cut deals with anti-American elements and place their security and political concerns first. Even in areas where diplomacy might seem to work on paper -- Kashmir, Arab-Israeli peacemaking -- the United States is hampered by conflicts driven by deep ethnic and religious hostility and by internal politics in which its own allies (Israel, Pakistan, and India) can't be of much help. And in one of the cruelest ironies of all, the U.S. president who has gone further to engage Iran than any of his predecessors is watching any hope for diplomacy being ground up by a regime under siege in Tehran. What's more, the power of the small is being matched by the weakening of the big. You don't have to be a declinist (I'm not) to see how far the image of American power has fallen**.** Forgetthe economic meltdown, which has much ofthe world wondering about what kind of great power the United States really is. America's currently fighting two wars where the standard for victory is not whether it can win but when it can leave. Whether it's an inability to get tough sanctions from the international community against Iran, bring Tehran to heel, make North Korea play ball, get the Arabs and the Israelis to cooperate, or push the Pakistanis to hit the Taliban and al Qaeda in a sustained way, the world has gotten used to saying no to America without cost or consequence. And that's very bad for a great power. Finally, there's the issue of how the country organizes itself. A new bureaucratic flowchart won't replace skill and luck, better marshal American power, or create genuine opportunities for success abroad. But if you don't have the right structure, it makes success all that much harder. And the United States has departed from the one model that has proven successful: the strong foreign-policy president empowering the strong secretary of state who rides herd over subcabinet-level envoys in real time and in close coordination with the president on strategy. Instead, the Obama administration has created an empire of envoys with power concentrated in the White House but without real purpose or strategy. The nation's top diplomat (the secretary of state) seems to be everywhere and nowhere in terms of owning issues and finding a way to take on some of the nastiest challenges, which is what secretaries of state are supposed to do. It's still early, and maybe the Obama administration will get lucky. Perhaps the Iranian regime will collapse or the Arabs and Israelis will do something good by themselves. But the next several years are more likely to be tough ones for American diplomacy. And the image that comes to mind isn't a terribly kind one: America as a kind of modern-day Gulliver tied up by tiny tribes abroad and hobbled by its inability to organize its own house at home.